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Abstract 
Although there are numerous studies on impact evaluation of overall health insurance, 
little is known on the impact of health insurance on health care utilization and out-of-
pocket health care spending of children, especially in developing countries. This paper 
measures the impact of child health insurance on health care utilization and spending of 
children from 6 to 14 years old in Vietnam using two recent nationally representative 
surveys. Unlike previous empirical studies which found a positive effect of health 
insurance on health care utilization in Vietnam, we did not find a statistically significant 
effect of school health insurance as well as free health insurance for children on outpatient 
health care contacts. However, the school health insurance and free health insurance help 
the insured children decrease out-of-pocket spending per outpatient contact by around 14 
and 26 percent, respectively.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Although Vietnam has been very successful in poverty reduction, the incidence of poverty 
remains rather high, especially in rural areas. According to Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Surveys, the poverty rate was reduced from 28 percent in 2002 to 14 percent in 
2008. The incidence of rural poverty was around 18 percent in 2008. Poverty and poor 
health have a two-way relationship. One of important causes of poverty which is 
mentioned in all Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) studies is health shocks (World 
Bank 2001; 2004). Having low income, people are more likely to have low nutrition and 
health care.  
Children can be more vulnerable to illness. Poor children tend to have limited 
access to preventive and sanitized facilities such as clean water and flush toilet and might 
be easier to get diseases and illness. According to World Bank (2004), children in low 
expenditure quintiles are more likely to be under weight and height compared to other 
children. The percentage of children who have low height and weight for age is 13 and 9 
percent for the children in the richest quintile, respectively. However, these corresponding 
figures for the children in the lowest quintile is 34 and 33 percent, respectively.  Without 
proper treatment, illness can have adverse impacts of children’s health and schooling. 
These adverse impacts can be mitigated if children have health insurance. Thus, provision 
of health insurance is very necessary for children, especially the poor ones.      
 Yet, there are still a large number of children not having health insurance in 
Vietnam. Children under 6 years old are provided with free health insurance by the 
government. For children from 6 years old, there are two main schemes of health 
insurance, which are operated by Vietnam Health Insurance Organization (VHI) on non-
profit and public basis. The first is school health insurance, which is provided for school 
children on a voluntary basis. The second scheme of health insurance is free health 
insurance for the poor children. According to the 2008 Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey, there were 18 percent of children aged between 6 and 14 not having 
health insurance.  
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To improve health and medical care of people, the government has set up a policy 
to achieve full coverage of health insurance by 2015. All the children will be covered by 
school health insurance and free health insurance. Although these schemes of health 
insurance are necessary, there exist questions on their effectiveness. They are sometimes 
to blame for poor health care services (e.g., Luong Nga 2004). Thus impact evaluation of 
current school health insurance and free health insurance for children can provide the 
government with helpful information on expansion and modification of child health 
insurances.   
There are a large number of studies aiming to measure the effect of a health 
insurance policy or program in both developed and developing countries. Although health 
insurance is expected to increase health care utilization, empirical findings on the impact 
of health insurance are not always consistent. Positive impacts of health insurance on 
health care demand and utilization are found in several studies such as Harmon and Nolan 
(2001), Yip and Berman (2001), Wagstaff et al. (2009). However, other studies find 
limited effects of health insurance on health care utilization and expenditures (e.g, Sapelli 
and Vial 2003; Davidoff et al. 2005; Ekman 2007).  
The impact of health insurance in Vietnam has been evaluated quantitatively in a 
number of studies. Positive impacts of health insurance on health care utilization are found 
in most studies such as Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005), Jowett et al. (2003).  Sepehri et al. 
(2006) and Wagstaff (2009) find that health insurance helps the insured reduce out-of-
pocket health expenditures.   
Although there are numerous studies on impact evaluation of overall health 
insurance, little is known on the impact of health insurance on health care utilization and 
out-of-pocket health care spending of children, especially in developing countries. There 
have been no studies on the impact of child health insurance in Vietnam. Thus, the main 
objective of this paper is to measure to what extent health insurance affects health care 
utilization and health spending for children aged from 6 to 14 using data from the most 
two recent Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in years 2006 and 
2008. Children below 6 years old are not considered, since all of them are provided with 
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health insurance, therefore there is no control group for them. The study will measure the 
effect of two health insurance policies for children including school health insurance and 
free health insurance. By doing so, this study is expected to contribute an empirical 
finding on the effect of health insurance policy for policy to the literature of health 
insurance.  
The paper is structured into five sections. The second section describes the health 
insurance for children in Vietnam in Vietnam. The estimation method is presented in the 
third section. The fourth section presents the empirical findings on impact evaluation. 
Finally, the fifth section concludes.  
 
2. Health insurance for children in Vietnam 
 
In this study, we will use data from the most two recent Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in years 2006 and 2008. These surveys were conducted by 
General Statistical Office of Vietnam with technical support of the World Bank. Each 
survey covers 9,189 households, which are representative for the national, rural and urban, 
and regional levels. The 2006 and 2008 VHLSSs set up a panel of 4,090 households and 
15,475 individuals.  
The surveys collect very detailed information on household and individual 
characteristics. Information on households and individuals includes demography, 
employment and labor force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, 
housing, fixed assets and durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation 
programs,. The surveys contain information on enrolment in different health insurance 
types, out-of-pocket spending on inpatient and outpatient treatments, other expenses on 
health care, health care utilization, the number of health care contacts during the 12 
months before the interview for all the sampled individuals.  
In Vietnam, health insurance has been implemented by the government since 1992. 
Nowadays, there are three main schemes of health insurance in Vietnam. The first is 
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compulsory health insurance which is applied for employees in formal sectors. The second 
is voluntary health insurance.  The third is free health insurance for the poor which is 
provided by the government for the poor without fee. The compulsory and free health 
insurance are provided by the public sector, while the voluntary health insurance can be 
provided by both public and private sectors.   
Health insurance types for children are all public and non-profit in Vietnam. 
Children under 6 years old are provided with free health insurance. The main type of 
health insurance for children above five years old is school health insurance. This is 
voluntary health insurance and users must pay for that. The average fee of school health 
insurance is around VND 80,000 (approximately USD 4 in June 2011).  It should be noted 
that the schooling rate is very high in Vietnam, at around 95 percent for the primary and 
lower-secondary school.  
The other type of health insurance that children, especially the poor ones can 
obtain is free health insurance for the poor. The provision of health insurance for the poor 
has been supported by “Health Care Fund for the Poor” (HCFP) since 2003. The annual 
amount that is used to subsidize a beneficiary is about VND 70000 (approximately USD 
4.4). Members in households who are classified as the poor by commune authorities can 
be eligible for this health insurance. In addition, children in policy families can be also 
provided with free health insurance.    
Fig. 1 Distribution of pupils aged from 6 to 14 by health insurance status  
The year 2006 The year 2008 
  
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSS 2006-2008. 
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Figure 1 shows that around 52.3 and 10.4 percent of children had school health 
insurance and free health insurance in 2006, respectively. The coverage of health 
insurance increased remarkably in 2008. 63.2 and 18.9 percent of children had school 
health insurance and free health insurance, respectively.  
There might be at least two possible reasons why some schoolchildren do not have 
health insurance. Firstly, health insurance premium can be relatively costly for some poor 
households (this reason is reported in several studies, e.g., according to a survey on 
willingness to pay for voluntary health insurance which was conducted by Hanoi National 
Economics University and World Bank in 2005, 20 percent of people do not buy health 
insurance because of the cost). Secondly, health insurance is sometimes to blame for poor 
health care service, and people can find it unhelpful to have health insurance (Labor 
Newspaper 2010).  
Fig. 2  Annual out-patient contacts and out-of-pocket spending per contact in 2008 
Annual out-patient contacts Out-of-pocket spending (thousand VND) 
  
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSS 2006-2008. 
Figure 2 shows that there is a negligible difference in the average annual out-
patient contacts between the insured and uninsured children. However, the out-of-pocket 
spending per contact is much lower for the insured than the uninsured.  
 
3. Estimation method 
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To measure the effect of health insurance on health utilization outcomes, we assume the 
following functions: 
ititititit TXHY εββββ ++++= 3210   (1) 
where itY is an indicator of health care utilization. Health care utilization indicators 
including children’s annual health care contacts and out-of-pocket health expenditure. H is  
a vector of dummy variables of enrolment in school health insurance and free health 
insurance (it is equal one for the insured and zero for the uninsured). X is a vector of 
household and individual characteristics. The description and summary statistics of 
explanatory variables are presented in Table A.1 in Appendix. T is the time dummy which 
equals one for the 2008 year and zero for the 2006 year. itε denotes unobserved variables. 
 There are two problems in estimating equation (1). The first problem is that the 
dependent variable Y is not a standard continuous variable. When annual health care 
contacts are the dependent variable, Poisson regressions which are applied for count 
dependent variables should be used. There are also a large number of children who did not 
use the health care services and had zero expenditure on health care. Thus Tobit 
regressions of out-of-pocket spending should be used when the dependent variable is out-
of-pocket spending. We do not present the Poisson and Tobit regressions in this paper, 
since they are standard and presented in most econometrics textbooks.  
A second problem is endogeneity of health insurance. Parent who pay special 
attention to their children’s health can be more likely to buy health insurance for children 
and bring their children to health care centers more often. In this study, we use panel data 
fixed-effects regressions to remove the endogeneity bias due to time-invariant unobserved. 
Fixed-effect regression will, however, fail to remove all endogeneity bias if the 
unobserved variables which affect health care outcome and health insurance are not time-
invariant. It is expected that the estimation bias resulting from these factors is small 
relative to the bias eliminated by using fixed-effects regression. 
While the fixed-effect Poisson estimator are well developed and the program code 
of this estimator is available in several statistical software such as Stata, the fixed-effects 
Tobit model cannot be estimated using a maximum likelihood method due to a so-called 
incidental parameter problem (Greene 2004). Instead, we will have to use a variant of 
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fixed-effect Poisson estimation which is developed by Wooldridge (2001). To illustrate 
this method, let’s write a standard Tobit model:  
     itiitititit vuTHDY +++++= 3210
* ββββ    (2) 
( )*,max itLit YyY =     (3) 
where *itY  and itY  are values of latent and observed out-of-pocket spending on health care,  
Ly is the non-zero lowest observed spending. itε  in equation (1) is decomposed into iu  
and itv  which are time-invariant and time-variant unobserved variables, respectively. iu is 
allowed to be correlated with health insurance, but itv  is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
health insurance. Wooldridge (2001) assumes that iiiii aTXHu ++++= 7654 ββββ . We 
can substitute this equation to equation (2): 
     itiiiiitititit aTXHTXHY εββββββββ +++++++++= 76532140* , (4) 
where iH , iX , iT  are the mean value over two years of child i. ia  denotes the unobserved 
effect with zero mean and uncorrelated with health insurance. Thus iu is eliminated in 
equation (4), and this equation can be estimated by a standard random-effects Tobit model 
(See Wooldridge 2001) for more detailed discussion on assumptions on distribution of the 
error terms in the model).  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
Table 1 presents Poisson regressions of the number of annual out-patient contacts. Both 
school and free health insurance are not statistically significant in the fixed-effect 
regressions. In addition to the regression coefficients, marginal effects are presented. 
Since Poisson and Tobit models are not linear and regression coefficients do not have 
clear economic meaning. Table 1 shows that the point estimates have very small 
magnitudes. It should be noted that we do not examine the effect of health insurance on 
inpatient health care since only a few children in the data set reported the use of inpatient 
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health care services. There are only 73 children (around 3 percent) reporting the inpatient 
health contact in 2008.   
Table 1  Poisson regressions of the number of annual out-patient contacts 
Explanatory variables 
Panel data random effects model Panel data fixed-effects model 
Coef. Std. Err. Marginal 
Effect 
Coef. Std. Err. Marginal 
Effect 
School health insurance 0.1088 0.0740 0.0277 0.0990 0.0986 0.0139 
Free health insurance  0.2112** 0.1006 0.0585** 0.1446 0.1492 0.0217 
Age -0.0704*** 0.0170 -0.0181***    
Sex (male = 1, female=0) 0.0457 0.0753 0.0117    
Ethnic minorities (yes = 1) -0.3094** 0.1369 -0.0727**    
Sick during the past 4 weeks 3.1845*** 0.1153 3.8501*** 3.0216*** 0.1642 1.4126*** 
Sick during the past 12 months 2.8119*** 0.1094 1.4917*** 2.7128*** 0.1559 0.4973*** 
Log of per capita income -0.0858 0.0572 -0.0220 -0.2927*** 0.0849 -0.0417*** 
Household size -0.1453*** 0.0278 -0.0373*** -0.3125*** 0.0681 -0.0445*** 
Age of head 0.0001 0.0037 0.0000    
Head without edu. degree Omitted      
Head with primary education -0.0021 0.1037 -0.0005    
Head with lower-secondary 0.0388 0.1221 0.0101    
Head with upper-secondary 0.1908 0.1376 0.0524    
Head with post-secondary -0.2256 0.2649 -0.0522    
Head without spouse 0.2139 0.1367 0.0596    
Spouse without edu. degree Omitted      
Spouse with primary education -0.0645 0.1025 -0.0164    
Spouse with lower-secondary -0.2902** 0.1296 -0.0689**    
Spouse with upper-secondary 0.1048 0.1513 0.0281    
Spouse with post-secondary 0.1658 0.2847 0.0462    
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) -0.0657 0.1022 -0.0165    
Red River Delta Omitted       
North East -0.3417** 0.1624 -0.0780**    
North West 0.1059 0.2473 0.0285    
North Central Coast 0.0054 0.1525 0.0014    
South Central Coast 0.3032** 0.1522 0.0881**    
Central Highlands 0.3285** 0.1547 0.0965**    
South East 0.4356 0.1412 0.1326    
Mekong River Delta 0.5808*** 0.1345 0.1849***    
Constant -0.7614 0.5230     
Number of observations   3485   1426 
Number of individuals   1846   713 
Note: The marginal effect of the number of health care contacts with respect to the explanatory variables. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant. 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSS 2006-2008. 
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Table 2 Tobit regressions of out-of-pocket spending per out-patient contact 
Explanatory variables 
Panel data random effects model Panel data random effects model with 
group mean variables 
Coef. Std. Err. Marginal 
Effect 
Coef. Std. Err. Marginal 
Effect 
School health insurance -7.048*** 2.686 -3.054*** -9.144** 3.947 -3.971** 
Free health insurance  -10.424*** 3.583 -4.339*** -8.551* 5.085 -3.581* 
Age 2.131*** 0.570 0.918*** 2.105*** 0.586 0.907*** 
Sex (male = 1, female=0) 2.364 2.162 1.018 2.093 2.163 0.901 
Ethnic minorities (yes = 1) -6.080 3.827 -2.574 -4.771 4.015 -2.028 
Sick during the past 4 weeks 41.066*** 3.346 20.306*** 34.197*** 4.907 16.530*** 
Sick during the past 12 months 28.181*** 2.412 12.633*** 28.859*** 3.674 12.952*** 
Log of per capita income 3.997** 1.993 1.721** 4.600 3.973 1.981 
Household size 0.337 0.804 0.145 -0.066 2.878 -0.028 
Age of head -0.042 0.115 -0.018 -0.048 0.115 -0.021 
Head without edu. degree Omitted      
Head with primary education -4.303 3.324 -1.838 -4.773 3.333 -2.037 
Head with lower-secondary -1.963 3.826 -0.842 -2.302 3.837 -0.986 
Head with upper-secondary -3.419 4.368 -1.456 -3.883 4.390 -1.652 
Head with post-secondary -9.818 9.387 -4.049 -9.464 9.418 -3.910 
Head without spouse 2.657 4.335 1.155 2.750 4.335 1.196 
Spouse without edu. degree Omitted      
Spouse with primary education 1.023 3.399 0.442 1.043 3.400 0.450 
Spouse with lower-secondary -2.467 4.030 -1.056 -2.442 4.032 -1.045 
Spouse with upper-secondary 6.872 5.006 3.034 6.950 5.022 3.070 
Spouse with post-secondary 41.525*** 9.990 21.428*** 41.714*** 9.996 21.549*** 
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) -0.046 3.107 -0.020 -0.121 3.122 -0.052 
Red River Delta Omitted      
North East -8.903** 4.240 -3.722** -8.935** 4.245 -3.736** 
North West -5.011 6.147 -2.114 -4.285 6.227 -1.813 
North Central Coast -6.755* 3.964 -2.843* -6.693* 3.969 -2.818* 
South Central Coast -4.736 4.327 -2.004 -5.002 4.325 -2.115 
Central Highlands 2.615 4.525 1.137 2.564 4.564 1.115 
South East -6.351 4.297 -2.676 -6.933 4.345 -2.915 
Mekong River Delta -13.409*** 4.108 -5.533*** -14.014*** 4.148 -5.772*** 
Mean group variables       
Sick during the past 4 weeks    13.136** 6.714 5.657** 
Sick during the past 12 months    -1.512 4.855 -0.651 
Log of per capita income    -1.326 4.586 -0.571 
School health insurance    3.161 5.287 1.361 
Free health insurance     -4.062 6.902 -1.749 
Household size    0.477 2.983 0.205 
Constant  -42.700** 18.398  -36.481* 21.892  
Number of observations   3485   3485 
Number of individuals   1846   1846 
 
Note: The marginal effect for the expected value of outcome conditional on being uncensored. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant. 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSS 2006-2008. 
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Table 2 presents Tobit regressions of out-of-pocket spending per outpatient 
contact. As known, the fixed-effects Tobit model cannot be estimated without bias using a 
maximum likelihood method due to a so-called incidental parameter problem (Greene 
2004). To remove time-invariant unobserved effects, we a random effects model with 
available explanatory variables and group means of these explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge 2001; Sepehri et al. 2006). According to this model, school health insurance 
and free health insurance help the insured decrease the out-of-pocket spending per out-
patient contact by 4 and 3.6 thousand VND (around 14 and 26 percent, respectively).  
 We also include interactions between health insurance and gender and age of 
children to see whether the effect of health insurance on out-of-pocket spending differs by 
gender and age (Table 3). In this table, we report only the coefficients of health insurance 
and interactions. Coefficients of control variables are not reported. The interactions are not 
statistically significant, indicating the effect is not different for children of different ages 
and between girls and boys.   
Table 3 Tobit regressions of out-of-pocket spending per out-patient contact with interactions 
Explanatory variables 
Panel data random effects model Panel data random effects model with 
group mean variables 
Coef. Std. Err. Marginal 
Effect 
Coef. Std. Err. Marginal 
Effect 
School health insurance -9.851 4.197 -4.295 -3.229 13.204 -1.398 
Free health insurance  -7.337 5.535 -3.085 6.302 18.318 2.783 
School health insurance * sex 0.761 4.582 0.329    
Free health insurance * sex -2.800 6.315 -1.194    
School health insurance * age    -0.609 1.219 -0.263 
Free health insurance * age    -1.429 1.678 -0.617 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations   3485   3485 
Number of individuals   1846   1846 
 
Note: the marginal effect for the expected value of outcome conditional on being uncensored. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant. 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSS 2006-2008. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Currently, the government of Vietnam has set up eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), in which there are four ones related to health: (i) Eradicate Extreme Poverty and 
Hunger, (ii) Reduce Child Mortality, (iii) Improve Maternal Health, (iv) Combat 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases. Accordingly, provision of health insurance can 
contribute to achievement of these MDGs, and the government has set up an objective of 
full coverage of health insurance by 2015. Vietnam has been very successful in increasing 
the coverage of health insurance for the children recently. In 2006, 52.3 and 10.4 percent 
of children had school health insurance and free health insurance, respectively. After two 
years, in 2008, the percentage of children having school health insurance and free health 
insurance increased to 63.2 and 18.9 percent, respectively.  
 Although the coverage of health insurance for children increased, there is a 
question on the quality of health care services provided for the insured children. This 
paper measures the effect of school health insurance and free health insurance on the 
health care utilization and health expenditure for children from 6 to 14 years old in 
Vietnam. It is found that both health insurance schemes do not increase outpatient health 
contacts. It is possible that children have to attend school and they only visit health centers 
when very necessary. Having health insurance does not encourage children to visit the 
health centers more frequently. The school health insurance and free health insurance help 
the insured reduce the out-of-pocket spending per out-patient contact by around 14 and 26 
percent, respectively. We do not find a statistically significant difference in the effect of 
both school health insurance and free health insurance between girls and boy as well as 
between different age groups.    
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable Type 2006 2008 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age Discrete 9.768 1.687 11.702 1.681 
Sex (male = 1, female=0) Binary 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.500 
Ethnic minorities (yes = 1) Binary 0.198 0.399 0.200 0.400 
Sick during the past 4 weeks Binary 0.162 0.369 0.110 0.313 
Sick during the past 12 months Binary 0.357 0.479 0.348 0.476 
Log of per capita income Continuous 8.521 0.645 8.831 0.692 
Household size Discrete 5.151 1.575 5.039 1.561 
Age of head Discrete 42.90 11.73 44.32 11.20 
Head without edu. degree Binary 0.260 0.439 0.238 0.426 
Head with primary education Binary 0.301 0.459 0.298 0.458 
Head with lower-secondary Binary 0.262 0.440 0.274 0.446 
Head with upper-secondary Binary 0.152 0.359 0.163 0.369 
Head with post-secondary Binary 0.025 0.155 0.027 0.162 
Head without spouse Binary 0.125 0.331 0.129 0.335 
Spouse without edu. degree Binary 0.240 0.427 0.225 0.418 
Spouse with primary education Binary 0.296 0.457 0.290 0.454 
Spouse with lower-secondary Binary 0.208 0.406 0.230 0.421 
Spouse with upper-secondary Binary 0.109 0.312 0.103 0.304 
Spouse with post-secondary Binary 0.021 0.145 0.023 0.150 
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) Binary 0.190 0.393 0.191 0.393 
Red River Delta Binary 0.176 0.381 0.176 0.381 
North East Binary 0.144 0.352 0.144 0.352 
North West Binary 0.058 0.233 0.058 0.233 
North Central Coast Binary 0.135 0.342 0.135 0.342 
South Central Coast Binary 0.106 0.308 0.106 0.308 
Central Highlands Binary 0.104 0.305 0.104 0.305 
South East Binary 0.126 0.332 0.126 0.332 
Mekong River Delta Binary 0.151 0.358 0.151 0.358 
Mean group variables      
Sick during the past 4 weeks Continuous 0.135 0.252 0.137 0.253 
Sick during the past 12 months Continuous 0.351 0.364 0.351 0.365 
Log of per capita income Continuous 8.597 0.625 8.607 0.625 
School health insurance Continuous 0.538 0.441 0.554 0.440 
Free health insurance  Continuous 0.197 0.318 0.193 0.313 
Household size Continuous 5.107 1.537 5.080 1.506 
Source: Estimation from panel data of VHLSS 2006-2008. 
